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Abstract
This paper presents a new identification result for causal effects of group-level variables
when agents select into groups. The model allows for group selection to be based on individual
unobserved heterogeneity. This feature leads to correlation between group-level covariates and
unobserved individual heterogeneity. Whereas many of the existing identification strategies rely
on instrumental variables for group selection, I introduce alternative identifying conditions which
involve individual-level covariates that “shift” the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity. I
use these conditions to construct a valid control function. The key identifying requirements on
the observable “shifter” variables are likely to hold in settings where a rich array of individual
characteristics are observed. The identification strategy is constructive and leads to a semipara-
metric, regression-based estimator of group-level causal effects, which I show to be consistent
and asymptotically normal. A simulation study indicates good finite-sample properties of this
estimator. I use my results to re-analyze the effects of school/neighborhood characteristics on
student outcomes, following the work of Altonji and Mansfield (2018), and I find that moving
from a 10th to 90th percentile school/neighborhood increases wages by 17.58%.
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1 Introduction
Policy makers often design interventions to influence individual outcomes through group-level vari-
ables. For instance, a government may reallocate disadvantaged children to higher quality schools
to improve their academic performance. Given their potential impact, many studies in economics
have sought to evaluate group-level policy interventions (see Durlauf, 2004; Durlauf and Ioannides,
2010; Graham, 2018, and references therein). Nevertheless, estimation of group-level treatment
effects is challenging. The problem is that individuals select into groups in part based on their
unobserved characteristics, and this sorting causes systematic dependence among group-level vari-
ables and those individual characteristics. Therefore, comparing outcomes across groups without
accounting for differences in unobserved heterogeneity is subject to selection bias.
This paper presents a novel identification result for group-level partial effects using observable
variables that “shift” the distribution of unobserved individual heterogeneity. Informally, a random
vector W is a “shifter” for another (unobservable) random vector Θ if the conditional distribution
of Θ, given W = w, varies sufficiently with w. A key insight of this paper is that controlling
for group-level distributions of observable shifters accounts for variation in unobserved individual
heterogeneity. Thus, if there remains enough variation in group-level variables conditional on the
control variables, group-level causal effects become identifiable.
For simplicity, suppose that unobserved individual heterogeneity Θ takes two values, “high”
and “low,” denoted by θH and θL. Then, an observable W is a shifter for Θ if Pr(Θ = θH |W = w)
is a non-constant function of w, or equivalently, if there exist w1, w2 such that the 2 × 2 matrix
Π = [Pr(Θ = θl|W = wk)]k=1,2;l=H,L is non-singular. The availability of a shifter is useful because
a group-level distribution of W can be written as a linear transformation of the distribution of
Θ within the same group, where the matrix of this linear transformation is Π. Since Π is non-
singular, there exists a one-to-one mapping between group-level distributions of the unobserved
variable Θ and the observable shifter W . Therefore, we can use an observable shifter to control for
across-group variation in unobserved heterogeneity distributions.
To fix ideas, consider a setting where students choose schools. Academically motivated students
may prefer high quality schools, and when they sort into schools based on this preference, there will
be a positive correlation between school-level teacher quality and the proportion of highly moti-
1
vated students within the school. Here, student’s motivation corresponds to unobserved individual
heterogeneity and school-level teacher quality is the group-level variable of interest. A possible
shifter for academic motivation is educational attainment of a child’s mother. It seems reasonable
to assume that the higher is a mother’s educational attainment, the more motivated her child tends
to be.
Now suppose that student’s motivation takes two values, high and low. Then, mother’s educa-
tion serves as a shifter if a child of a college graduate mother has a larger probability of being highly
motivated than a student whose mother has only a high school diploma. Provided that mother’s
education is a valid shifter, there exists a one-to-one mapping between a school-level fraction of
college graduate mothers and the distribution of student types within the school, which enables
us to control for across-school variation in student’s motivation. If school-wide teacher quality has
independent variation from the school-level distribution of mother’s education, then ceteris paribus
effects of teacher quality are identifiable. Note that mother’s education is not an instrumental
variable (IV): a valid IV would be independent of student’s motivation and be related to teacher
quality.
To provide further intuition on the above argument, I describe it with simple equations. Denote
an outcome of interest by Yis (e.g., test score), where i and s index agent and group, respectively,
group-level covariates of interest by Xs (e.g., school-wide teacher quality), an observable shifter
by Wi (e.g., mother’s education), and unobserved individual heterogeneity by Θi (e.g., academic
motivation). Like the above discussion, assume Θi takes two values, θH and θL (e.g., high and low
motivation). Also, let Ji be individual i’s group choice. Here, the interest lies in the causal effect
of teacher quality on test scores. The regression equation turns out to be
YiJi = α+X
′
Jiβ +W
′
iγ + δ Pr(Θi = θH |XJi , Ji) + εiJi , E[εis|Xs,Wi, Ji = s] = 0 (1)
where subscript Ji is present because a researcher only observes the outcome for the group indi-
viduals selected in the data. Since Pr(Θi = θH |Xs, Ji = s) cannot be estimated, its dependence
on Xs hinders the identification of β. In the school example, Pr(Θi = θH |Xs, Ji = s) corresponds
to the fraction of highly motivated students in a school with teacher quality Xs. In this frame-
work, the inability to control for a fraction of high motivation types confounds naive estimates of
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teacher-quality effects.
As noted above, the observable shifter condition implies that there exists a linear map from the
distribution of the observable shifter to the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, i.e., Pr(Θi =
θH |Xs, Ji = s) =
∑2
l=1 dl Pr(Wi = wl|Xs, Ji = s) for some d1, d2 ∈ R. Then, (1) becomes
YiJi = α+X
′
Jiβ +W
′
iγ +
2∑
l=1
δdl Pr(Wi = wl|XJi , Ji) + εiJi
where the error term εiJi is uncorrelated with all the other right-hand side variables. Since [Pr(Wi =
wl|Xs, Ji = s)]l=1,2 is identifiable from the data (e.g., school-level fractions of college graduate and
high school graduate mothers), β becomes identifiable.
I generalize the argument based on the two-point supported distribution of Θ to one with a
general distribution. To formalize the idea of shifter, I use the notion of statistical completeness,
which has been applied in a wide range of nonparametric identification problems. I argue that the
availability of a shifter is a reasonable assumption, especially when a researcher observes a rich
array of individual-level characteristics.
When completeness is used for identification, estimation often faces ill-posed inverse problems,
which may lead to poor finite-sample properties of estimators. The estimator in this paper circum-
vents this problem by applying the completeness assumption to estimation of a nuisance parameter
of the model. By additive separability of the nuisance function from the parameter of interest, the
estimator for group-level partial effects converges at a rate of the square root of the sample size as
happens in partially linear regression models.
For implementation, a researcher first picks a set of basis functions and computes the group-
means of the observable shifters transformed by those basis functions. She then runs a linear regres-
sion of the outcome on the group-level covariates, individual-level regressors, and the group-means
computed in the first step. I show that this procedure leads to a consistent and asymptotically
normal estimator, and I provide a consistent variance estimator. Monte Carlo experiments demon-
strate that the proposed estimator has low mean squared errors and that the associated confidence
intervals have high coverage accuracy in samples of moderate size.
I apply this method to the problem of studying the effects of school/neighborhood characteristics
on years of post-secondary education and adulthood wages. I build on the analysis of Altonji and
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Mansfield (2018), who also use a control function approach. This paper shows that the estimation
equation arising from my identification result encompasses that of Altonji and Mansfield. Thus,
my estimator is more robust to possible mis-specifications. I find that the two estimators produce
very similar estimates, which supports the results in Altonji and Mansfield.
This paper employs assumptions distinct from those of existing identification strategies. In
particular, I do not require natural/quasi experimental variation as often used in IV methods.
Instead, I use the observable shifter condition, which can hold in many applications of interest.
Thus, I provide an alternative approach to identifying group-level treatment effects. In addition, my
identification result has wide applicability since the argument based on the shifter condition extends
to non-linear and nonseparable models in a straightforward manner. From a theoretical perspective,
this paper achieves new identification results using unexploited yet empirically relevant features in
triangular models, such as group structures. Lastly, this paper applies statistical completeness in
a novel way to develop a control function approach. To elaborate on these contributions, I now
review the related literature.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper contributes to the large empirical literature that examines causal effects of neighborhood,
school, and, more generally, group-level characteristics.1 A non-trivial challenge in this literature
is how to control for endogeneity arising from agents selecting into groups (Durlauf, 2004; Graham,
2018). Many studies exploit exogenous variation in group selection via instrumental variables
(e.g., Angrist, Pathak, and Walters, 2013; Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007; Ludwig, Duncan, and
Hirschfield, 2001; Oreopoulos, 2003), some studies use detailed data on individual choice behavior
to control for selection bias (e.g., Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, Schellenberg, and Walters, 2017; Dale
and Krueger, 2002), and other studies use aggregation to mitigate influence of selection (e.g., Card
and Rothstein, 2007). In contrast, I take a control function approach that complements the existing
methods by exploiting a novel, yet empirically relevant identifying condition.
This paper is most closely related to recent work by Altonji and Mansfield (2018), who also
1A partial list includes Aaronson (1998); Abdulkadirog˘lu, Pathak, and Walters (2018); Altonji, Elder, and Taber
(2005); Angrist and Lang (2004); Chetty and Hendren (2018); Chetty, Hendren, and Katz (2016); Dobbie and Fryer
(2011); Gould, Lavy, and Paserman (2004); Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2009); Hoxby (2000). Also, Chetverikov,
Larsen, and Palmer (2016) study effects of group-level endogenous variables. They do not consider endogeneity from
selection and focus on other issues.
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employ a control function method. They show that group-means of individual covariates play
the role of control functions in their model. In contrast, I use group-means of transformations of
individual covariates as control functions, where these transformations are basis functions (e.g.,
polynomials and splines). Whereas Altonji and Mansfield exploit specific functional forms in their
model to justify their control function method, I use restrictions on the conditional distribution
of individual-level unobserved heterogeneity given observables to construct a control function. An
advantage of my approach is that the identification argument extends to non-linear, nonseparable
models in a relatively straightforward manner and thus my results apply to a wide class of models.
In addition, the estimation equation arising from my identification result encompasses that of
Altonji and Mansfield. In fact, when certain regression functions in the model are linear, the two
approaches produce effectively the same identification result.
Another strand of the related literature is the one on control function methods, which is also
connected to triangular models. A general triangular system takes the form
Y = m(X, ε)
X = h(Z, η)
where Y is the outcome of interest, X is potentially endogenous, and Z is an instrument indepen-
dent of the unobserved heterogeneity (ε, η). In his seminal work, Heckman (1974, 1979) develops
a control function approach where X is a binary variable, using additive separability and joint
normality of (ε, η). Subsequent papers (e.g., Dahl, 2002; Das, Newey, and Vella, 2003; Dubin and
McFadden, 1984; Lee, 1983) extend the model in different directions. Examples include allowing
for multinomial X and weakening parametric distributional assumptions. Also, Newey, Powell, and
Vella (1999) develop a control function method for nonparametric triangular systems and Blundell
and Powell (2004) use a control function to identify average partial effects in semiparametric limited
dependent variable models. Recently, Chesher (2003) and Imbens and Newey (2009) exploit strict
monotonicity of functions in unobserved heterogeneity to construct a control variate to identify
the ceteris paribus effect of X on Y (see also Matzkin, 2016, and references therein). I consider a
version of the triangular model that exploits availability of multiple measurements of groups as well
as an observable shifter to construct a control function. In contrast, the earlier literature seems
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to have largely focused on monotonicity restrictions and distributional assumptions on unobserved
heterogeneity as identifying conditions. The use of empirically relevant features such as multiple
measurements of groups offers a new approach to achieving identification in this class of models.
In addition, this paper is related to the growing literature on nonparametric identification using
statistical completeness. Since the seminal work of Newey and Powell (2003), completeness has been
applied to a wide range of econometric identification problems. Examples include nonparametric
IV (e.g., Chernozhukov and Hansen, 2005; Darolles, Fan, Florens, and Renault, 2011; Hall and
Horowitz, 2005; Newey and Powell, 2003), errors-in-variables models (Hu and Schennach, 2008),
nonparametric discrete choice models with unobserved product characteristics (Berry and Haile,
2014), and nonseparable (dynamic) panel data models (e.g., Arellano, Blundell, and Bonhomme,
2017; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010; Freyberger, 2018; Sasaki, 2015). See also the survey
article Hu (2017) and references therein. My paper applies the completeness assumption in a novel
way to construct a control function.
This paper shares with the literature on network formation the feature that agents form groups
endogenously within models (e.g., Blume, Brock, Durlauf, and Jayaraman, 2015; de Paula, 2017;
Graham, 2017, and see references therein). However, I consider a different group selection mech-
anism from those in the network literature. In particular, in my analysis, the utility function
for group selection does not depend on other individuals’ group choices and their characteristics.
Therefore, my model excludes certain selection patterns that are possible under network formation
models. Nonetheless, the model still covers many empirical settings of interest.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the econometric model
and provides a heuristic discussion of the identification strategy. In Section 3, I formalize the
identification idea. In Section 4, I propose a simple estimator of group-level partial effects and
study its asymptotic properties. Section 5 discusses the empirical application and Monte Carlo
experiments to examine finite-sample accuracy of the proposed estimator. Section 6 introduces two
extensions of the model described in Section 2. Section 7 concludes. Details of the proofs can be
found in the appendix.
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2 Setup and Overview of Results
In this section, I describe the econometric model. A researcher observes “cities,” indexed by
g = 1, . . . , G. Within each city, there exist groups and agents, indexed by s ∈ S ≡ {1, . . . , S} and
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , respectively. The outcome of interest, denoted by Yisg, takes the form
Yisg = β
′Xsg + γ′Wig + χsg + ωig + isg, E[isg|Xsg,Wig, χsg, ωig] = 0 (2)
where {Xsg : s ∈ S} and Wig are observable variables for groups and individuals, respectively,
{χsg : s ∈ S} and ωig denote unobservable characteristics for groups and individuals, respectively,
and {isg : s ∈ S} represents unobserved idiosyncratic terms. The focus of this paper is on group-
level causal effects, captured by β in (2). To identify this parameter, I require variation in group-
level variables. The presence of cities provides multiple measurements, or independent copies, of
groups and agents, which enables identifying the distribution of group-level covariates and within-
group distributions of individual variables. Below, I omit city index g to reduce notational burden
when appropriate.
To ground the discussion on concrete terms, consider the following examples.
Example 1 (Residential Segregation and Youth Outcomes). Graham (2018) surveys issues of
residential segregation and its consequence on youth outcomes. In one example, the outcome
Yis measures adulthood wage, Wi denotes the indicator of a resident being a minority, and Xs
represents the proportion of minorities in one’s neighborhood. Here a neighborhood corresponds
to a group. Unobservables that enter into the equation include resident’s innate cognitive ability
(ωi) and distance from the city center to one’s neighborhood (χs). The parameter of interest is
β, which measures how the proportion of minorities in one’s neighborhood affects an outcome of
interest. 
Example 2 (Effects of School District/Neighborhood on Student Performance). Altonji and Mans-
field (2018) examine effects of school district/neighborhood on various student outcomes. In one of
their empirical specifications, Yis is years of post-secondary education, Xs includes teacher-student
ratio and distance to four-year college, Wi contains student’s scores on standardized tests and par-
ents’ years of education, ωi includes how much parents value child’s academic learning, and χs
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represents unobserved characteristics of school. Here, a school district/neighborhood represents a
group. 
Example 3 (Effects of Hospital Ownership on Quality of Care). Sloan, Picone, Taylor, and Chou
(2001) study whether private, for-profit hospitals have lower quality of care. Since different types of
patients may select into for-profit hospitals compared to public ones, selection bias is of potential
concern. Here, a hospital corresponds to a group, the outcome Yis is patient’s condition after
hospitalization, Xs includes the indicator of whether the hospital is private and for-profit, and Wi
includes measures of health conditions before hospitalization. 
In these examples, a researcher observes the outcome variable only for the group an individual
selects into. To be precise, let Jig ∈ S be the group membership of agent i. Then, we only observe
Yig :=
∑
s∈S Yisg1{Jig = s}. I model the group membership determination as following.
Jig = J(Θig, A1g, . . . , ASg, ηi1g, . . . , ηiSg) (3)
where J(·) is an unknown function belonging to a nonparametric class, Θig is individual hetero-
geneity affecting the selection, {Asg : s ∈ S} are characteristics of groups affecting agents’ group
choice, and {ηisg : s ∈ S} are idiosyncratic terms. One example of the selection equation J(·) that
fits into this framework is the widely used random utility discrete choice model. In that setting,
J(Θi, A1, . . . , AS , ηi1, . . . , ηiS) = arg maxs∈S Vi(s) and Vi(s) = Θ′iAs + ηis, where Vi(s) represents
agent i’s utility choosing the group s, and the utility is specified as the group-level features As
weighted by the taste coefficient Θi plus the idiosyncratic term ηis. Random coefficient speci-
fication allows for heterogeneous tastes for group characteristics and accommodates complicated
selection patterns.
A key restriction on the selection function J(·) is that, loosely speaking, if a researcher were
to observe all the variables, she could compare groups with different Xs holding within-group
distributions of Θi constant. That is, there must exist separate variation in Xs from within-
group distributions of individual characteristics. This condition holds, for instance, in the random
utility discrete choice model satisfying the following: given x1, x2 ∈ supp(Xs), there exist ak ∈
supp(A|Xs = xk), k = 1, 2 satisfying a1s − a1s′ = a2s − a2s′ for all pairs of (s, s′) ∈ S2. Alternative
conditions are possible, and I formalize this assumption as non-singularity of some conditional
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variance in Section 3. Also, I accommodate the possibility that any or all of (Θi,ηi,A) in the
selection equation is not observed, and instead I impose that the observable Wi has non-trivial
relationship with the preference heterogeneity Θi.
An important feature of the selection equation (3) is that it does not depend on choices and
characteristics of other individuals, which excludes the types of models considered in network
formation literature. Yet, this does not exclude equilibrium effects. For instance, Xs can include
features of the distribution of individual characteristics within group s, which can be empirically
important since the coefficients on such variables may represent “peer effects,” e.g., the effect of
school-level minority fraction on student performance. As I will outline below, the control function
method I propose uses group-level averages of (transformed) variables Wi. If Xs includes some
features of the within-group distribution of a subvector of Wi (e.g., mean), the subvector needs to
be excluded from the construction of the control functions.
Given the outcome and selection equations, I now state the following sampling assumptions to
complete the model description.2
(Xg,χg,Ag)
iid∼ F, (Wig, ωig,Θig, ig,ηig) iid∼ H (4)
(Wig, ωig,Θig, ig,ηig) ⊥ (Xg,χg,Ag) (5)
(Wig, ωig, ig) ⊥ ηig|Θig (6)
where Xg = {Xsg : s ∈ S}, χg = {χsg : s ∈ S}, Ag = {Asg : s ∈ S}, ig = {isg : s ∈ S},
ηig = {ηisg : s ∈ S}, and F and H are distribution functions. Restriction (4) states that the
group-level features are i.i.d. copies across cities and individual-level variables are a random draw
across individuals and cities.
Condition (5) requires independence between individual variables and group-level variables. One
way to rationalize this independence assumption is that “nature” first draws group-level character-
istics, then subsequently samples individual characteristics whose distributions are independent of
group-level variables, and finally individuals select into groups. In Example 1, this scenario means
that first neighborhoods are formed, then individuals are drawn from the distribution that does
not depend on neighborhood characteristics, and after the realizations of group- and individual-
2These conditions are slightly stronger than those in Section 3. I maintain them here for ease of exposition.
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level variables, agents make decisions on which neighborhood to live in. This assumption seems
reasonable under static frameworks.
Condition (6) states that the idiosyncratic term in the choice equation is independent of other
individual-level variables conditional on the taste variable Θi. Independence is a strong assumption,
but such restriction has been commonly used in the literature of discrete choice models (e.g., Briesch,
Chintagunta, and Matzkin, 2010). Also, here the independence only needs to hold conditioning on
the taste heterogeneity.
2.1 Identification Problem
In this subsection, I describe a challenge in identifying the group-level effect β. Specifically, there are
two sources of endogeneity, omitted variable bias and selection bias. The former occurs from unob-
servability of group-level characteristics χs and potential correlation between Xs and χs. Although
this issue is practically relevant, it is well understood in the literature and this paper has little new
insight to offer on this problem. Instead, I focus on selection bias and assume that there is no cor-
relation between Xs and χs except in Section 6.1. In particular, I impose E[χs|Wi, Xs, Ji = s] = 0
for all s in this section.
For selection bias, the problem arises because the distribution of ωi, the unobservable in the
outcome equation (2), varies across groups and this variation is systematically related to Xs. In
the school example, the unobservable ωi represents student’s motivation, and school characteristics
affecting selection As contain the school-level teacher quality variable Xs. If highly motivated
students prefer high quality educational programs, students with high ωi are then more likely to
be in schools with higher Xs. This sorting pattern will cause bias on the coefficient on Xs.
I now formalize selection bias in the model. Recall that we only observe the outcome for
one group, i.e., Yi =
∑
s∈S 1{Ji = s}Yis, and computing the regression function given observable
variables yields
E[Yi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] = E[Yis|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] = β′Xs + γ′Wi + E[ωi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi].
Identifiability of β depends on whether the conditional expectation E[ωi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] is constant
in Xs. This model implication is closely related to the characterization of selection bias in Heckman
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(1976). He formulates that E[Y |Z, {selection rule}] = Z ′β + E[|Z, {selection rule}], where Z is a
vector of covariates and  is an error term. In my model {Ji = s} corresponds to the “selection rule.”
Heckman points out that many econometric models have this characterization and that agents’ self-
selection prevents identification of β when the term E[|Z, {selection rule}] is non-constant.
To gain some intuition on how the selection rule operates in my model, take As = Xs and
Ji = arg maxs∈S{Θ′iXs} (i.e., I set ηis = 0 for all i and s). Then, conditioning on {Ji = s} and
X implies Θi ∈ Rs(X) where Rs(X) = {Θ : (Xs − Xs′)′Θ > 0 for all s′ 6= s} is a region formed
by intersections of half planes. See Figure 1 for a simple illustration. Then, for the conditional
expectation E[ωi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi],
E[ωi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] = E[E[ωi|Ji = s,X,Wi]|Ji = s,Xs,Wi]
= E[E[ωi|Θi ∈ Rs(X),Wi]|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] (7)
where the second equality follows from (ωi,Θi,Wi) ⊥ X. Now, to see implications of the last
display, suppose E[ωi|Θi,Wi] = E[ωi|Wi]. Then (7) implies E[ωi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] = E[ωi|Wi] and
therefore no selection bias occurs. This result resembles the one in Heckman (1976): if unobserved
terms in outcome and selection equations (ωi and Θi in this model) are independent, there is no
endogeneity due to selection. On the other hand, if the conditional mean of ωi given Θi = θ and Wi
non-trivially changes with θ, then the term E[ωi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] varies with Xs since the shape of
Rs(X) changes with Xs. The dependence of E[ωi|Ji = s,Xs,Wi] on Xs results in non-identification
of β.
Note that the above argument continues to hold even if we deviate from the simplifying as-
sumption As = Xs, provided that As is related to Xs, which is likely the case. For example, Xs
measures school-level teacher quality, and students are likely to use it or its proxy as a basis of
their school choice decision. Also, the conditional mean independence of ωi given Θi is likely to fail
in applications if ωi contains unobserved heterogeneity that affects people’s preference for group
characteristics Θi, e.g., if student’s motivation affects preference for school quality.
Example 1 (Continued). Graham (2018) discusses potential sources of endogeneity that hinder
identification of causal effects of neighborhood segregation of minorities. Among the conditions he
discusses, the no sorting on (individual) unobservables condition is relevant to my paper. Roughly
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speaking, this condition requires that individuals with the same observed covariates are similar
across neighborhoods. It excludes, for example, racial minorities living in one neighborhood differ
substantially in their cognitive skills from minorities in another neighborhood.
To formalize the “no sorting” condition, redefine γ and ωi in (2) by projecting ωi onto Wi to
have Cov(Wi, ωi) = 0. This is little loss of generality since γ is a nuisance parameter. Then, the
no sorting condition can be represented as
E[ωi|Wi, Ji] = E[ωi|Wi],
where for Graham Wi is the indicator of whether the person is minority. This equation imposes
no systematic difference in the average of unobserved individual heterogeneity across neighbor-
hoods. In my model, this condition corresponds to E[ωi|Θi,Wi] = E[ωi|Wi] (i.e., no selection
bias condition in the above). To see this point, note E[ωi|Wi, Ji] =
∫
E[ωi|Wi, Ji,A,Θ]fΘA|W,J =∫
E[ωi|Wi,Θ]fΘA|W,J , where I use (5) and (6). If ωi and Θi are conditionally mean independent
given Wi, the integral integrates to one, which implies E[ωi|Wi, Ji] is independent of Ji. Therefore,
no selection bias in my model translates to the no sorting condition in Graham’s paper. Whereas
Graham explores scenarios under which this no sorting condition is plausible, I allow for failure of
this condition and instead use observable shifter variables to construct control functions. 
2.2 Heuristic Discussion of Identification Result
The previous subsection indicated the source of selection bias. Here, I discuss this paper’s approach
for identification emphasizing main ideas rather than technical details. For simplicity, assume finite
support of Θi, i.e., supp(Θi) = {θt : 1 ≤ t ≤ T}. We can view this discrete-valued heterogeneity Θi
as agents’ type and these types differ in preferences for group attributes As.
I can rewrite the outcome equation by decomposing ωi into its mean within group Ji and the
deviation.
Yi = β
′Xi + γ′Wi + E[ωi|Ji,A] + εi, εi = εiJi , εis = ωi − E[ωi|Ji = s,A] + χs + is (8)
where I write Xi ≡ XJi , εi ≡ εiJi to avoid double subscripts, and E[ωi|Ji = s,A] represents the
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expectation of ωi given that the individual selected group s and the underlying group features
are A. Conditioning on A is necessary because an agent observes and takes as given the group
features A when making group choice.3 In the above decomposition, Xi is uncorrelated with εi, and
therefore, endogeneity is present if and only if Xs has non-zero correlation with the within-group
mean E[ωi|Ji = s,A]. For this conditional expectation, we have
E[ωi|Ji = s,A] =
T∑
t=1
E[ωi|Ji = s,A,Θi = θt] Pr(Θi = θt|Ji = s,A)
=
T∑
t=1
E[ωi|A,Θi = θt] Pr(Θi = θt|Ji = s,A)
=
T∑
t=1
E[ωi|Θi = θt] Pr(Θi = θt|Ji = s,A). (9)
where the second equality follows from Ji = J(Θi,A,ηi) and independence ωi ⊥ ηi|Θi, and the
third equality uses A ⊥ (Θi, ωi).
The last equation indicates that across-group variation in E[ωi|Ji = s,A] comes from variation
in Pr(Θi = θ|Ji = s,A). The key insight of this paper is that Pr(Θi = θ|Ji = s,A) can be
expressed as a linear function of the conditional distribution of the observable shifter Wi given
(Ji,A), and therefore, accounting for across-group variation in observable shifter distributions
solves the endogeneity problem of Xs.
To sketch the identification argument, I assume finite support of Wi, i.e., supp(Wi) = {wl : 1 ≤
l ≤ L}. This is without loss of generality since I can always create a discrete random variable from
continuous one by binning. In the case of discretely distributed Θi, Wi is a shifter for Θi if the
matrix
Π =

Pr(Θi = θ1|Wi = w1) . . . Pr(Θi = θT |Wi = w1)
. . .
Pr(Θi = θ1|Wi = wL) . . . Pr(Θi = θT |Wi = wL)

is of full column rank. This condition formalizes the idea that the conditional distribution of Θi
given Wi = w exhibits enough variation in w. Also it requires that the cardinality of supp(Wi)
3Another way to see this point is that A is invariant across individuals given Ji = s. The sample group mean
is average over i, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 1{J(Θi,A,ηi) = s}ωi/
∑N
i=1 1{J(Θi,A,ηi) = s} and A is independent of i. Then,
the sample group means converges in probability to the expecatation conditional on A. This calculation is akin to
computing probability limits of sample means over long time horizon in panel data models. Given a variable Xit and
fixed effects αi, T
−1∑T
t=1Xit →P E[Xit|αi] under suitable conditions.
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is larger than that of supp(Θi) since full column rank fails if L < T . This full rank condition
may be reasonable when a researcher observes a rich array of individual-level variables that are
related to individual taste for group-level attributes. In the neighborhood example, variables such
as education level, health status, type of occupation, and ethnicity are likely to have non-trivial
relationships with individual taste for various neighborhood characteristics.
Doing similar calculations to those for (9) and by Bayes’ rule,
Pr(Wi = w|Ji,A) =
T∑
t=1
Pr(Wi = w|Θi = θt) Pr(Θi = θt|Ji,A)
=
T∑
t=1
Pr(Θi = θt|Wi = w) Pr(Wi = w)Pr(Θi = θt|Ji,A)
Pr(Θi = θt)
and dividing the both sides by Pr(Wi = w),
Pr(Wi = w|Ji,A)
Pr(Wi = w)
=
T∑
t=1
Pr(Θi = θt|Wi = w)Pr(Θi = θt|Ji,A)
Pr(Θi = θt)
We can write this equation in matrix form
piw = Πpiθ (10)
where piw = [Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A)/Pr(Wi = wl)]Ll=1 and piθ = [Pr(Θi = θt|Ji,A)/Pr(Θi = θt)]Tt=1.
Since Π is of full column rank by the observable shifter assumption, we have piθ = Gpiw where
G = (Π′Π)−1Π′, and the t-th element of this linear equation looks like
Pr(Θi = θt|Ji,A) = Pr(Θi = θt)
L∑
l=1
Gtl
Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A)
Pr(Wi = wl)
≡
L∑
l=1
dtl Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A)
where Gtl is the (t, l)th element of G and dtl is a constant independent of (Ji,A). Substituting this
last result into (9), we obtain
E[ωi|Ji,A] =
T∑
t=1
E[ωi|Θi = θt]
L∑
l=1
dtl Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A)
=
L∑
l=1
δl Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A), δl =
T∑
t=1
dtlE[ωi|Θi = θt]
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and finally the outcome equation becomes
Yi = β
′Xi + γ′Wi +
L∑
l=1
δl Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A) + εi
where Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A) is identifiable from the data and Cov(Xi, εi) = 0. Therefore, the vector
[Pr(Wi = wl|Ji,A)]Ll=1 plays the role of a control function to account for the endogeneity of Xs
with respect to unobserved individual heterogeneity ωi.
3 Identification Result
In this section, I formalize the heuristics described in the preceding section. For that purpose, I
impose the following conditions on the model. Below, let Lp(µ) be the class of functions whose
pth power is integrable with respect to µ. For a random object V , I write FV for its distribution
function.
Assumption 1. Let Bg ≡ (Xg,χg,Ag).
(i) Bg is a random draw across g. Conditional on Bg, (Wig,Θig, ωig, ig,ηig) is i.i.d. across i,
and (Wig,Θig, ωig, ig,ηig) is independent across g.
(ii) (Wig, ωig,Θig) ⊥ Bg and ηig ⊥ (Wig, ωig)|Θig,Bg.
Assumption 2. The distribution of B is dominated by some measure. The random vectors (Wi,Θi)
have a joint density with respect to the product measure of some σ-finite measures µ and λ. The
densities fΘ|W , fΘ, fW are bounded.
Assumption 3. The following mapping Ψ defined on L2(FΘ) is injective;
(Ψh)(w) =
∫
h(θ)fΘ|W (θ|w)dλ(θ).
Also, {fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)/fΘ(θ) : s ∈ S,b ∈ supp(B)} ⊂ L2(FΘ).
From this assumption, Theorem 15.16 in Kress (2014) implies that there exist {τj ≥ 0 : j ∈ N}
and an orthonormal basis {φj : j ∈ N} on L2(FΘ) such that τ2j φj = Ψ∗Ψφj where Ψ∗ is the adjoint
operator of Ψ. Assume τj is ordered such that τj ≥ τj+1 for all j ≥ 1.
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Assumption 4. With {(τj , φj) : j ∈ N} defined above,
fΘ|J,B(·|s,b)/fΘ(·) ∈F1 =
{
f ∈ L2(FΘ) :
M∑
j=1
∣∣〈f, φj〉Θ∣∣ <∞} for all s ∈ S,b ∈ supp(B)
E[ωi|Θi = ·] ∈F2 =
{
f ∈ L2(FΘ) :
M∑
j=1
τ−1j
∣∣〈f, φj〉Θ∣∣ <∞},
where M = sup{j : τj > 0} and 〈f, g〉Θ =
∫
fgdFΘ. M can be positive infinity.
Assumption 1 describes the sampling. Part (i) formalizes the idea that the distribution of
group-level variables and the within-group distribution of individual observables are identifiable
from the data. Part (ii) restates conditions (5) and (6) in a weaker form. Assumption 2 imposes
mild restrictions on the distribution of (Θi,Wi,B).
Assumption 3 is a generalization of the full column rank condition used in the previous sec-
tion. It ensures that the integral equation, which is the infinite-dimensional analogue of (10), is
“invertible” in a suitable sense. This injectivity condition, usually referred to as L2-completeness,
is a high-level assumption but has been widely used in the recent econometric literature on non-
parametric identification (see Section 1.1). Intuitively, injectivity requires the density of fΘ|W (·|w)
to sufficiently vary in the conditioning value w. One example of (Θ,W ) satisfying completeness is
Θ = ΓW +ν where ν given W is distributed as Normal(0,Σ), Σ is invertible, and Γ is of full column
rank. More sufficient conditions for different types of completeness can be found in the literature
(Andrews, 2017; D’Haultfoeuille, 2011; Hu, Schennach, and Shiu, 2017; Hu and Shiu, 2018; Mat-
tner, 1993). One way to justify this technical condition is to assume that in the population, there
are a finite number of agent types which differ in preferences. Under this assumption, injectivity
reduces to the full column rank of the conditional probability matrix as analyzed in the previous
section. The strategy of modeling unobserved heterogeneity as finite number of types has been em-
ployed in empirical studies. For instance, recent papers of Abowd, McKinney, and Schmutte (2018)
and Bonhomme, Lamadon, and Manresa (2018) study the consequence of worker-firm matching on
labor market earnings and model worker and/or firm heterogeneity as discrete types. Viewing un-
observed heterogeneity as finite types provides one way to rationalize Assumption 3. Nonetheless,
completeness is applicable more generally and the condition can hold with continuous heterogeneity
variable as well.
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Also, Assumption 3 imposes restrictions on the relative tail of fΘ|J,B and fΘ. In this model,
selection into groups allows the within-group distribution of Θ to differ from the original distribution
of Θ to the extent that this tail condition is satisfied. For instance, the model excludes the case
where Θ has a Gaussian tail and the within-group distribution has a polynomial tail. This is a
high-level condition since it is not straightforward to characterize the within-group distribution
from the model primitives. Also, note the conditioning on B. In Section 2, I impose stronger
independence assumptions and only condition on A, but here I slightly weaken the independence
assumptions and thus conditioning on B is necessary.
Assumption 4 restricts the permissible classes for fW |J,B and E[ωi|Θi]. It requires that
fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)/fΘ(θ) =
∞∑
j=1
cj(s,b)φj(θ),
∞∑
j=1
|cj(s,b)| <∞,
E[ωi|Θi = θ] =
∞∑
j=1
djφj(θ),
∞∑
j=1
|dj/τj | <∞,
for some cj(s,b) ∈ R, dj ∈ R, j ∈ N. A restrictive, yet easily interpretable sufficient condition
is that there exist integers M and L, possibly dependent on (s,b), such that cj(s,b) = 0 for all
j > L and dj = 0 for all j > M . This condition implies that fΘ|J,B/fΘ and E[ωi|Θi = ·] can be
represented as finite linear combinations of the L2-basis {φj : j ∈ N}.
Now, I state a key lemma for the identification of group-level partial effects.
Lemma 1. Suppose Assumptions 1-4 hold. Then, there exists some function ψ such that
E[ωi|Ji = s,B] =
∫
ψ(w)dFW |J,B(w|s,B)
where FW |J,B is the conditional distribution function of Wi given Ji,B and
∫
ψ2dFW <∞.
This lemma suggests a way to control for the selection bias. To see the implication, from (8),
Yi = β
′Xi + γ′Wi +
∫
ψ(w)dFW |J,B(w|Ji,B) + {ωi − E[ωi|Ji,B]}+ χi + i
= β′Xi + γ′Wi +
∞∑
k=1
δkE[pk(Wi)|Ji,B] + εi (11)
where χi = χJi , i = iJi , εi = εiJi , εis = ωi − E[ωi|Ji,B] + χs + is, {pk : k ∈ N} is a basis
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for L2(FW ), and {δk : k ∈ N} satisfies
∫
(ψ −∑Kk=1 δkpk)2dFW → 0 as K → ∞. The class of
approximating functions is chosen by the researcher and the conditional distribution of Wi given
Ji and B is just a within group distribution of Wi, which is identifiable from the data. Since εi is
uncorrelated from Xi, inclusion of {E[pk(Wi)|Ji,B] : k ∈ N} controls for endogeneity arising from
selection.
Example 2 (Continued). Altonji and Mansfield (2018) also use a control function approach to
address selection bias under a very similar econometric model. Despite some differences in imposed
conditions,4 Lemma 1 generalizes their result. In particular, Proposition 1 in Altonji and Mansfield
states
E[ωi|Ji,B] = pi′E[Wi|Ji,B]
for some pi. By taking ψ(w) = pi′w, Lemma 1 in this paper and their Proposition 1 coincide.
Lemma 1 encompassing their Proposition 1 has an important implication for estimation. The
estimation method considered in this paper approximates ψ using a series basis expansion. Suppose
a researcher chooses polynomial or spline basis functions. Then, the estimation equation based on
Lemma 1 specializes to the version used by Altonji and Mansfield if series expansion terminates
after the constant and linear terms. Therefore, we can view the series-based estimation proposed
in this paper as a robustified version of Altonji and Mansfield’s control function method. 
3.1 Main Result
Now I formally state the identification of group-level partial effects. The object FW |J,B(·|Ji,B) is a
random distribution function, i.e., a function-valued random element. Thus, there exists a σ-field
generated by FW |J,B(·|Ji,B) and the conditional expectation given FW |J,B(·|Ji,B) is well defined.
Assumption 5. (i) For s ∈ S, E[εig|Jig = s, FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)] = 0 and E[Vigεig] = 0 where
εig = εiJigg and Vig = (X
′
igW
′
ig)
′.
(ii) The matrix
E[{Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]}{Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]}′]
4I elaborate on different assumptions between the two papers in Section 5.1.1.
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is invertible.
Assumption 5 (i) imposes exogeneity of χs and excludes the case of omitted variable bias. It
also assumes that Wi is uncorrelated with {ωi − E[ωi|Ji,B]}. Since γ is not the parameter of
interest, I can rewrite the regression equation by projecting {ωi − E[ωi|Ji,B]} onto Wi to make
them uncorrelated. Part (ii) is a version of the key identification condition for partially linear
models. In the regression equation (11), the interest lies in β and we want to “partial out” the
nuisance parameter
∫
ψdFW |J,B. Here the within-group distribution of Wi, denoted by FW |J,B, is
estimable from the data and conditional on the value of FW |J,B,
∫
ψdFW |J,B is a constant and thus
differencing eliminates this nuisance parameter.
Part (ii) requires that Xs does not include functions of the within-group distribution of Wi, e.g.,
the within-group mean of Wi. This follows from E[h(Wi)|FW |J,B(·|Ji,B)] = E[h(Wi)|Ji,B] for every
measurable function h.5 Sometimes it is desirable to include within-group distributional features in
Xs since they represent “peer effects” as in Example 1. To accommodate such situations, it suffices
to have a subvector W subi of Wi that satisfies Assumption 3, i.e., (Θi,W
sub
i ) is L
2-complete. Then,
a researcher can include distributional features of Wi in Xs provided that the included elements
are not part of W subi .
Building on Lemma 1, the following theorem formalizes the identification of coefficients on
group-level variables.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 hold. Then, β in the equation (2) is identified.
4 Estimation and Inference
Lemma 1 suggests an estimation method by series approximation. If a researcher observed within-
group distributions of Wig, then the estimator based on least squares is
βˆoracle = S(P
′
KPK)
−1PKY
5This claim follows if E[h(Wi)|Ji,B] is measurable with respect to σ(FW |J,B), the σ-field generated by
FW |J,B(·|Ji,B). A σ-field on the space of distribution functions can be defined by the σ-field generated by maps
h → ∫ hdF where h ≥ 0 is a measurable function from Rk → R and F is a random distribution function (see
e.g., Kallenberg, 2017). The measurability of E[h(Wi)|Ji,B] follows from the representation E[h(Wi)|Ji,B] =∫
h(w)dFW |J,B(w|Ji,B).
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where PK = [PK11PK21 . . . PKNG]
′, PKig = (X ′ig,W
′
ig,E[p1(Wig)|Jig,Bg], . . . ,E[pK(Wig)|Jig,Bg])′,
K represents the number of series terms, Y = (Y11, . . . , YNG)
′, and S = [IdxOdx×(dx+dw+K)] where
dx, dw denote the dimensions of X,W , respectively, Id is the d × d identity matrix, and Od1×d2 is
the d1 × d2 matrix with all elements equal to zero.
In practice, a researcher needs to estimate within-group distributions. Define the following
object
Eˆ[pk(Wig)|Jig,Bg] =
N∑
j=1
pk(Wjg)1{Jjg = Jig}
/ N∑
j=1
1{Jjg = Jig}.
Then, the feasible version of the above estimator is
βˆ = S(Pˆ′KPˆK)
−1PˆKY
where PˆK = [PˆK11 . . . PˆKNG]
′ and PˆKig = (X ′ig,W
′
ig, Eˆ[p1(Wig)|Jig,Bg], . . . , Eˆ[pK(Wig)|Jig,Bg])′.
To analyze asymptotic properties of βˆ, I impose additional assumptions. To state the conditions,
write λmax(·), λmin(·) for the maximum and minimum of eigenvalues of the argument. Let ‖ · ‖ be
the Euclidean norm for vectors and the induced norm for matrices. Also, write εig = εiJigg to avoid
double subscripts.
Assumption 6. The basis functions {pk : k ∈ N} are uniformly bounded and the eigenvalues of the
matrix QK = E[PKigP ′Kig] are bounded and bounded away from zero uniformly in K. In addition,
the class {pk : k ∈ N} is a subset of some VC-class of functions as defined in van der Vaart and
Wellner (1996). In addition, for some mx,mw > 4, E[‖Wig‖mw ] + E[‖Xsg‖mx ] <∞ for all s ∈ S.
Assumption 7. Write Aig for the σ-field generated by {Wig, Xig, Jig,E[pk(Wig)|Jig,Bg] k ∈ N}.
Then, E[εig|Aig] = 0, and there exist fixed constants c1, c2, C1, C2 such that, with probability one,
0 < c1 ≤ E[εigεjg|Aig,Ajg] ≤ C1, E[ε4ig|Aig, Jig] ≤ C2, and λmin(E[PKigP ′Kjgεigεjg]) ≥ c2 > 0 for
all K.
Assumption 8. Let rKig =
∑∞
k=K+1 δkE[pk(Wig)|Jig,Bg]. There exists some b > 0 such that
E[r2Kig] = O(K−2b).
The above assumptions are relatively standard in the series estimation literature. However, the
“basis functions” used in this procedure are conditional expectations of basis functions. Therefore,
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there are no general sufficient conditions for λmax(QK) to be bounded above and for λmin(QK)
and λmin(E[PKigP ′Kjgεigεjg]) to be bonded away from zero. Since these high-level conditions may
not be easily verifiable, one approach is to take a “flexible parametric” view, which is to assume
that the function ψ in Lemma 1 can be approximated by finitely many but unknown number of
basis functions. In that case, the model is essentially parametric and verifications of the conditions
become straightforward.
The boundedness of basis functions in Assumption 6 holds for most of basis functions used
in practice if the support of Wig is compact. The unbounded support case would require use of
different norms. For its second part, I assume that the second moment matrix of PKig is positive
definite for all K and, in particular, that the eigenvalues are bounded above and away from zero.
However, as mentioned above, there are no general primitive conditions for bounded eigenvalues
as the series terms are the conditional expectations of original basis functions. In the proof, I
make it explicit how the estimator depends on the minimum/maximum eigenvalues to understand
how eigenvalues tending to zero/infinity may affect the asymptotic distributional properties of the
estimator.
Assumption 7 imposes boundedness of the conditional variance of εisg from above and below and
boundedness of the conditional fourth moment. The restriction on the conditional variance seems
to be standard in the literature and I use the finite fourth moment to verify Lindberg condition for
central limit theorem. Assumption 8 controls the bias term in series approximation. This condition
can be verified for specific {pk : k ∈ N} if the function ψ has enough smoothness (see e.g., Belloni,
Chernozhukov, Chetverikov, and Kato, 2015, and references therein).
Now, I formally state the asymptotic properties of βˆ. Define ξK = supw ‖(p1(w), . . . , pK(w))′‖,
and ζK = ξK + (NG)
1/mw + G1/mx where mw,mx are defined in Assumption 6. In practice, this
quantity ζK is at least as large as
√
K, and below I take ζK ≥
√
K.
Theorem 2. Suppose β is identified in (11) and for some c > 0, Pr(Nsg/Ng ≥ c for all s ∈
S and g) → 1 where Nsg =
∑N
i=1 1{Jig = s} and Ng =
∑S
s=1Nsg. Under Assumptions 1, 6-8, if
ζ2K logK/G→ 0 and G/K2b = o(1), then
√
G(βˆoracle − β) = SQ−1K
1√
G
G∑
g=1
ψNg + oP(1)
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where
ψNg =
1
N
N∑
i=1
PKigεig.
Furthermore, if Var(χsg − E[ωig|Jig = s,Bg]) > 0 for each s and ζ4K/G→ 0, then
Ω
−1/2
K SQ
−1
K
1√
G
G∑
g=1
ψNg  Normal(0, Idx)
where
ΩK = SQ
−1
K E[ψNgψ
′
Ng]Q
−1
K S
′
and ‖Ω−1K ‖ is uniformly bounded. Finally, if ζK
√
K log(NG)/N → 0, then
√
G(βˆ − βˆoracle) = oP(1).
Theorem 2 characterizes asymptotic distribution of βˆ and provides a set of sufficient conditions
under which βˆ is asymptotically equivalent to the oracle estimator βˆoracle. It also states that the
convergence rate of βˆ is
√
G rather than
√
GN . That N does not show up in the convergence rate
comes from within-group correlations of residuals. The residual εisg contains group-level unobserv-
able χsg, which causes within-group dependence. The within-group correlation is formalized by
the requirement Var(χsg − E[ωig|Jig = s,Bg]) > 0. As seen below, this within-group correlation
requires the standard error estimator clustered at group levels.
In the first part of the theorem, I assume that the number of individuals in each group grows
at a proportional rate with the city-wide number of individuals for every city. This requires that
the probability of selecting into a group is uniformly bounded away from zero for all groups. This
assumption guarantees that I can estimate the within-group means of pk(Wig) uniformly well across
groups and cities.
In the theorem, I also impose restrictions on (relative) growth rates of K, N, and G. The first
two are ζ2K logK/N = o(1) and G/K
2b → 0. These conditions are standard in the literature except
that I have ζ2K , which includes terms related to the number of finite moments of Wig and Xsg.
The non-standard part of the requirement is ζ4K/G → 0. This condition requires at least fourth
moments of Wig and Xsg to be finite. Particularly, it implies that E[‖Xsg‖mx ] <∞ with mx > 4 and
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E[‖Wig‖mw ] < ∞ with mw > 4 satisfying N4/G(mw−4) → 0. The finite moment condition allows
control of the rate at which the maximum of ‖Wig‖ and ‖Xig‖ over (i, g) grows. In addition, this
rate condition requires that ξ4K/G→ 0, which is stronger than what is used in the literature (e.g.,
Cattaneo, Farrell, and Feng, 2018). Since this paper’s emphasis is on the constructive identification
result, I maintain this assumption and plan to improve on this aspect of the theoretical result in
the future research.
For inference, we need a consistent estimator of the variance. A natural estimator of ΩK is
ΩˆK = SQ˜
−1
K ΣˆKQ˜
−1
K S
′
where Q˜K = Pˆ
′
KPˆK/GN , ΣˆK =
1
G
∑G
g=1 ψˆNgψˆ
′
Ng, ψˆNg =
1
N
∑N
i=1 PˆKig(Yig − Pˆ ′Kig θˆ), and θˆ =
(Pˆ′KPˆK)
−1(Pˆ′KY). The following theorem formalizes that this variance estimator is consistent.
Theorem 3. In addition to the hypothesis of Theorem 2, if ζ3K
√
K/G+ ζ3KK
−b → 0
and for some mε > 2, E[|εisg|mε ] <∞ and ζK
√
(GN)1/mε logK/G→ 0 hold, then
‖Ωˆ−1/2K −Ω−1/2K ‖ = oP(1).
5 Numerical Results
5.1 Empirical Application
I employ the results of this paper to study the neighborhood/school-district effects on student
outcomes. Particularly, I use the National Longitudinal Study of 1972 (NLS72), which was one of
the datasets analyzed by Altonji and Mansfield (2018).6 They consider an econometric model very
similar to (2)-(3). However, the selection equation in this paper is more general and I impose a
set of different conditions to achieve identification. Their Proposition 1 implies that the outcome
equation can be written as
Yis = X
′
sβ +W
′
iγ + pi
′E[Wi|Ji,B] + εis
6They analyze three other datasets in their paper, all of which are restricted-use. The dataset based on NLS72 is
publicly available.
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and the term pi′E[Wi|Ji,B] plays the role of a control function to eliminate selection bias. Lemma 1
in this paper suggests that in general the control function may not be linear in within-group means
of observable shifter Wi. Since least squares estimation based on series expansions covers the general
nonlinear case and nests the linearity case, the estimation method proposed in this paper can test
whether the linear specification is a reasonable approximation of the data generating process.
An empirically relevant concern is that even after including control functions, there remains
“omitted variable bias” because Xs and χs are potentially correlated and a researcher does not ob-
serve χs. That is, the least squares estimate of β converges in probability to β˜ = β+E[XsX ′s]−1E[Xsχs],
which includes the coefficient of linear projection of χs on Xs. There are two approaches address-
ing this issue. The first approach is to interpret what the parameter β˜ measures. Suppose the
conditional expectation E[χs|Xs] is linear in Xs. Then, β˜ represents the average partial effect of
moving a student across schools where the transfer involves an infinitesimal change in the observ-
able variables Xs. This parameter may be relevant under policy interventions where students are
transferred to other schools without changing the joint distribution of (Xs, χs). This type of policy
has been considered in the literature and is known as associational redistribution (Durlauf, 1996).
See also Graham (2018) for discussion.
The second approach, the one taken by Altonji and Mansfield, is to develop lower bounds for
some measures of group-level effects on outcomes. They look at the impact of shifting from the
10th to the 90th quantile of the school/neighborhood characteristics, Q90(X
′
sβ + χs)−Q10(X ′sβ +
χs). If X
′
sβ + χs is normally distributed, this difference in quantile can be expressed as 2 ∗
1.28 ∗√Var(X ′sβ + χs), and Altonji and Mansfield provide conditions under which Var(X ′sβ˜) ≤
Var(X ′sβ + χs). Since Var(X ′sβ˜) is estimable from the data, this approach produces feasible lower
bounds for the object of interest.7
I follow the same lower bound approach to study the school/neighborhood contribution to
early adulthood wage earnings of students and years of post-secondary education. Also, I view
the least squares estimate of β as the average partial effect of moving students across schools.
Table 1 displays estimates of three measures of school/neighborhood effects on early adulthood
log wage (with two sets of regressors) and years of post-secondary education. For each out-
7Altonji and Mansfield also look at the fraction of variance attributable to school/neighborhood quality. They
employ random effects modeling to estimate the variance of the school-level unobserved term and decompose the
variance to estimate the (lower bound of the) variance fraction.
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come variable, I estimated the regression model in two specifications. The first one uses group
means of individual covariates, which is the specification of Altonji and Mansfield, and the sec-
ond contains group means of interaction and squared terms as additional controls. In the table,
“AM” denotes the first specification and “This Paper” refers to the second. The first and sec-
ond rows are the impact of moving a student from a 10th percentile neighborhood to a 90th/50th
percentile one i.e., {Φ−1(q) − Φ−1(0.1)}√Var(X ′sβ), q ∈ {0.9, 0.5} where Φ−1 denotes the in-
verse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The third row presents the av-
erage effect of reallocating a student from one neighborhood to another, where the reallocation
increases each of the observable group characteristics by one standard deviation i.e., sd(Xs)
′β with
sd(Xs) = [
√
Var(X1s) . . .
√
Var(Xdxs)]
′.
Across outcome variables and estimands, the linear and quadratic specifications produce very
similar estimates. For the log wage outcome, moving a student from a 10th percentile school to
a 90th percentile increases the wage by 17.58% ≈ (100 ∗ exp(0.162) − 100) with post-secondary
education as a control and by 17.11% without the control. For the 10th versus the 50th percentile,
the increases are 8.44% and 8.22% for the two specifications. I also report the average reallocation
effect with a one standard deviation increment on each of the observable group-level variables,
which are 0.089 and 0.104 in log wage, although theses estimates are not statistically different from
zero.
For years of post-secondary education, the shift from a 10th to 90th/50th percentile school
induces increases of 0.37 and 0.19 years, which correspond to 0.22 and 0.11 standard deviation,
respectively. These estimates suggest non-trivial effects of school/neighborhood quality on how
many years of education students attain after graduating from high school. On the other hand,
the third measure indicates a more moderate increase of 0.05 years (0.03 standard deviation). As
discussed above, the first two measures rely on normality of X ′sβ and the third parameter assumes
linearity of E[χs|Xs] for interpretability and measures average reallocation effects. Although the
three measures indicate different magnitudes of impact, they consistently suggest positive effects
of school/neighborhood quality on post high school educational attainment.
The estimates in this paper differ from those in Altonji and Mansfield to some degree. For
instance, they report the point estimates of 0.121 and 0.125 for log wage increase by moving from
the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile, which contrast with 0.158 and 0.162 in this paper.
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The discrepancy arises because Altonji and Mansfield use a random effects model to estimate the
variance of group-level unobservable term whereas I use the ordinary least squares (OLS) method.
When I employ the same estimation approach, the quadratic specification still produces estimates
very similar to the ones based on the specification of Altonji and Mansfield (see Table 3). I choose
the OLS results as my main estimates for consistency with the theoretical results proven in this
paper. However, one can expect that under appropriate conditions, methods based on random
effects models will be valid using the control function method.
5.1.1 Differences in Assumptions
In this subsection, I discuss the main differences between the assumptions in this paper and those
of Altonji and Mansfield (2018). Their key conditions include linearity of the regression func-
tions E[Wig|Θig],E[ωig|Θig] and what they term “spanning assumption.” To define the spanning
assumption, introduce the new random vector Uig and write
ωig = c
′Uig
Θig = ΓWig + ∆Uig + νig
where c ∈ Rdu , Γ ∈ Rdθ×dw , and ∆ ∈ Rdθ+du are fixed parameters, and νig ∈ Rdθ is a random vector
uncorrelated with (W ′ig, U
′
ig)
′. Let ΠUW be the matrix of coefficients for linear projection of Uig
onto Wig. Then, the spanning assumption of Altonji and Mansfield is that there exists a matrix R
such that
∆ = (Γ + ∆ΠUW )R.
Intuitively, the spanning assumption requires that for each element of As, if Ui influences the taste
coefficient for that element of As, then either one of them has to hold: Wi affects the taste coefficient
directly by Γ having non-zero elements or indirectly by non-zero correlation with Ui.
In this paper, I use an injectivity condition (Assumption 3) as well as restrictions on permissible
classes of densities and conditional expectations to construct a control function. Unlike Altonji and
Mansfield, I do not impose linearity in conditional expectations and instead use restrictions on
the distribution, which makes the spanning assumption and Assumption 3 quite different. In fact,
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there are examples where one of the two holds but the other fails. However, if (W ′ig, U
′
ig, ν
′
ig)
′ are
jointly normal, the two conditions coincide. Despite the differences, Lemma 1 nests Proposition
1 in Altonji and Mansfield and therefore, the estimator proposed in this paper is generally more
robust than the one in their paper.
5.2 Monte Carlo Experiments
In this subsection, I present results of simulation studies to investigate finite-sample properties
of the proposed estimator. For the Monte Carlo experiments, I first generate characteristics of
individuals and groups based on distributions mimicking the empirical distributions of the NLS72
data. Then, for each individual, I compute utility functions of choosing different groups and then
assign people to groups to maximize the sum of utilities under group size constraints. This design
builds on Altonji and Mansfield, and the realized allocation can be viewed as an approximation to
the equilibrium of a competitive market through price mediation.
I consider three data generating processes (DGPs). The first design has E[ωi|Ji,A] = pi′E[Wi|Ji,A]
for some non-stochastic vector pi, and thus the linear specification of Altonji and Mansfield is cor-
rect. For the second DGP, I deliberately model E[ωi|Ji,A] = pi1E[W 2i |Ji,A] + pi2E[W 3i |Ji,A] to
see how deviation from linearity affects the estimator. For the third DGP, I take ωi to be a lin-
ear combination of some normal random variable and binary variable 1{W ′iτ > νi} where τ is a
non-stochastic vector and νi is an independent normal random variable. This design is meant to
capture a more realistic scenario in which non-linearity may be a issue. Here non-linearity arises
due to discreteness of part of ωi, though ωi itself is continuously distributed. See Section B in the
appendix for further details of the DGPs.
Table 2 presents the mean squared error (MSE) and the coverage probability of the 95% confi-
dence intervals based on the proposed estimator for three different specifications: one without any
controls, the linear specification of Altonji and Mansfield, and the one including additional series
approximation terms. For DGP 1, the OLS estimate without any control function behaves poorly
both in terms of MSE and the coverage probability of the confidence interval. The MSE is more
than twice as much as the linear specification and the coverage probability is 64%, substantially
lower than the nominal confidence level. In this model, linear specification is correct and including
additional control variables does not alter the results much. For the second design, I made the
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DGP particularly difficult for the linear specification to see how deviation from linearity affects
performance of the estimator. Since the cubic specification is exactly correct, it performs much
better in terms of MSE and coverage probability than the linear specification. For the last DGP,
the group-level expectation of ωi is Φ(W
′
iτ) where Φ(·) is the standard normal cumulative distri-
bution function, and even the cubic specification is mis-specified. Yet, the estimator with cubic
controls performs reasonably well and outperforms the linear one. Although this Monte Carlo study
is small-scale, it indicates usefulness of including additional control variables to reliably estimate
group-level partial effects.
6 Extensions
6.1 Instrumental Variables for Omitted Variable Bias
In the previous sections, I assume away omitted variable bias by imposing exogeneity of χsg. If
instrument variables Zsg for χsg are available, combination of the control function and IV methods
identifies the partial effects of group-level covariates under the presence of both selection and
omitted variable biases.
Assumption 9. (i) In addition to {(Yig, X ′ig,W ′ig, Jig)′}1≤i≤N,1≤g≤G, a researcher observes {Zsg}s∈S,1≤g≤G
and, after redefining Bg by including Zg = {Zsg : s ∈ S}, Assumption 1 holds.
(ii) For all s ∈ S, E[εisg|FW |J,B(·|s,Bg), Jig = s] = 0 and E[Z˜igεisg|Jig = s] = 0 where Z˜ig =
(Z ′ig,W
′
ig)
′.
(iii) Recall Vig = (X
′
ig,W
′
ig)
′. The matrix E[Z˜ig{Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]}′] is of full column
rank.
Theorem 4. Under the hypothesis of Lemma 1 and Assumption 9, β in (2) is identified.
This result is a straightforward extension of Theorem 1 but can have an important application.
For instance, if a policy intervention creates an exogenous variation in teacher assignment to dif-
ferent schools and households select schools after the intervention, then omitted variable bias (i.e.,
correlation between Xsg and χsg, where Xsg measures school-level teacher quality) can be resolved
through IV but selection bias remains problematic for identification of coefficients on Xsg. Theorem
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4 establishes that the combination of IV and control function methods achieves identification of
group-level partial effects.
6.2 Nonparametric Identification
I extend the identification result to a more general outcome equation
Yisg = m(Xsg,Wig, εisg)
Jig = J(Bsg,Θig,ηig).
In the linear model, I distinguish among (ωig, χsg, isg) but in this model εisg subsumes all the
unobservable components due to its nonseparability. In this model, a family of parameters can be
defined as
M(x) :=
∫
m(x,w, e)fWε(w, e)d(w, e) x ∈ X
where fWε is the joint density of (Wig, εisg) and X ⊂ supp(Xsg) is some non-empty set. This object
is called Average Structural Function (ASF) in the literature and it summarizes partial effects of a
covariate X on the outcome Y . For identification, I impose the following conditions.
Assumption 10. (i) (Wig, εisg) ⊥ ηig|Θig,Bg and (Wig, εisg,Θig) ⊥ Bg. Also, (Wig, εisg) has
identical distributions across s ∈ S.
(ii) sups∈S,b∈supp(Bg) E[|m(x,Wig, εisg)||Jig = s,Bg = b] <∞.
(iii) Given non-empty X ⊂ supp(Xsg), supp(fW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)) is invariant conditional on Xig = x
for x ∈ X .
Assumption (i) imposes independence between χsg and Xsg, stronger than mean exogeneity of
χsg given Xsg. Thus, I assume away omitted variable bias and focus on the issue of selection bias.
Imposition of identical distributions across s ∈ S simplifies some arguments and interpretation of
the parameter. Assumption (ii) is used to justify interchanging orders of certain integrations. The
requirement (iii), which states that the support of fW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg) is invariant conditional on Xig,
is referred to as support condition in the literature on triangular models, and it is considered to be
a stringent assumption. Still, it holds for some special case. If the conditional support of A given
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Xs = x does not vary with x, then the support condition holds. This sufficient condition excludes,
among other things, that Xs is part of As. This may not be so restrictive if individuals only observe
a coarse version of Xs when they make group decision. That is, As is a noisy measure of Xs.
The following theorem states the identification result for the nonseparable model.
Theorem 5. If Assumptions 1, 2, 3, and 10 hold, M(x) is identified for x ∈ X .
If the support condition is not satisfied, we can still identify different versions of ASF as done
in the literature. For instance, a conditional version of ASF is
∫
m(x,w, e)fWε|fW |J,B(w, e|f)d(w, e) x ∈ X
where I condition on the random function fW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg). We can see this parameter as a measure
of the partial effect conditioning on a within-group distribution of individual characteristics. For
example, if εisg represents an unobservable measure of student’s motivation, then the conditional
ASF represents the average outcome for different levels of group-level covariate X, fixing the within-
school distribution of student’s motivation.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents a new identification result for group-level causal effects in a setting where
individuals select into groups partially based on their unobserved heterogeneity. I build an econo-
metric model that extends Heckman’s selection model to feature group-level variables and show
that group-level covariates correlate with the group-mean of the individual unobserved heterogene-
ity. As an alternative to instrumental variables, I exploit observable shifters to construct a valid
control function and develop a formal identification result of group-level ceteris paribus effects in
a partially linear model. I propose a simple two-step semiparametric regression-based estimator,
prove its consistency and asymptotic normality, and provide a consistent variance estimator. Simu-
lation studies indicate good finite-sample properties of the proposed estimator. I also consider two
extensions of the control function method. First, I combine the control function method with IVs
to address another source of endogeneity, which I call omitted variable bias, and, second, I develop
a nonseparable version of the model to identify the average structural functions. Finally, I empir-
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ically study the effects of school/neighborhood characteristics on student outcomes following the
work of Altonji and Mansfield (2018) and find that their linear specification is robust to inclusion
of additional controls.
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Figure 1: Support of Θ Partitioned by Group Choice
Notes. This is an example of partitioning of the support of Θi by {Ji = 1}, {Ji = 2}, and {Ji = 3} (S = 3). The
above figure is created based on A1 = (1, 3), A2 = (3, 2), and A3 = (4, 1) with Ji = arg maxs∈{1,2,3}{Θ′iAs}. If Θi
falls onto the red region, Ji = 1 will be chosen. Similarly, the blue region represents Ji = 2, and the green region
means Ji = 3.
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Table 1: Estimates of School/Neighborhood Effects on Wage and Years of Post Secondary
Education
Wage w/ PS. Ed. Wage w/o PS. Ed. Yrs. PS. Ed.
AM This Paper AM This Paper AM This Paper
Q10-90
0.157 0.162 0.153 0.158 0.352 0.369
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.079) (0.089)
Q10-50
0.078 0.081 0.076 0.079 0.176 0.185
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.039) (0.045)
APE
0.102 0.104 0.092 0.089 0.064 0.052
(0.217) (0.248) (0.228) (0.254) (0.007) (0.007)
Mean
2.878 2.878 1.836
Notes. The table shows various estimates for effects of school/neighborhood quality on early adulthood wage and
years of post-secondary education. The first and second row groups (“Q10-90” and “Q10-50”) correspond to the
impact of moving from the 10th percentile school/neighborhood to the 90th/50th percentile, respectively, and the
third row group (“APE”) denotes the estimate of the average partial effects when each element of observed
school/neighborhood characteristics increases by one standard deviation. The top headers indicate outcome
variables in regression. “Wage w/ PS. Ed.” and “Wage w/o PS. Ed.” refer to log wage with/without
post-secondary education as a control, respectively, and “Yrs. PS. ED.” denotes years of post-secondary education.
“AM” refers to the specification used in Altonji and Mansfield (2018) and “This Paper” specification adds
within-school means of interaction and squared terms of Wi variables. For each row group, the number in the first
line is the estimate and the number in parentheses represents the standard error estimate. The last row is the
average of dependent variables in the data sample.
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Table 2: Results of Monte Carlo Experiments
Specification
Naive AM This Paper
DGP 1
MSE 2.304 1.000 1.016
Prob. 0.640 0.914 0.915
DGP 2
MSE 116.270 1.000 0.008
Prob. 0.000 0.003 0.933
DGP 3
MSE 90.571 1.000 0.724
Prob. 0.000 0.876 0.921
Notes. The table presents the results of simulation studies, particularly the mean squared error (MSE) and
coverage probability of the confidence interval for different specifications. The columns “Naive” represents
regression with no group-means included as controls, the column “AM” corresponds to the specification of Altonji
and Mansfield, and the column “This Paper” denotes the specification with group means of cubic polynomial
expansions of individual variables. Each row group presents different data generating processes, the row “MSE”
presents MSE of the corresponding estimator divided by the MSE of linear specification, and the row “Prob.” is the
coverage probability of the 95% confidence interval constructed from the corresponding estimator. The sample size
is G = 1, 000 and for each city, N = 300 and S = 3 with each group’s size constraint being no more than 115 people.
Table 3: Empirical Application: Random Effects Model
Yrs. PS. Ed. Wage w/o PS. Ed. Wage w/ PS. Ed.
AM This Paper AM This Paper AM This Paper
Q10-90
No Unobs. 0.215 0.267 0.121 0.123 0.125 0.122
w/ Unobs. 0.503 0.516 0.203 0.214 0.203 0.207
Q10-50
No Unobs. 0.107 0.134 0.061 0.061 0.063 0.061
w/ Unobs. 0.251 0.258 0.102 0.107 0.102 0.104
Sample Means
1.620 2.880 2.880
Notes. The estimates come from the random effects model assuming normality of the error terms. The column
header indicates dependent variable used and “Q10-90” and “Q10-50” refer to effects of shifting from the 10th
percentile neighborhood to the 90th/50th percentile neighborhood. The estimates are based on the lower bound on
variance as described in Section 5.1. “No Unobs” rows display variance lower bound estimates excluding the
random effect estimate from school/neighborhood contribution. “w/ Unobs” includes the random effect estimate as
part of school/neighborhood contribution.
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A Appendix: Proofs
Let Lp(µ) be the class of functions whose pth power is integrable with respect to µ. I write FW , FΘ
for the distribution of random vectors W,Θ, and so on.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Inverse of Ψ
Recall
Ψh(w) =
∫
h(θ)fΘ|W (θ|w)dλ(θ).
Let H be the range of Ψ on L2(FΘ). I show that h ∈ H is square-integrable with respect to FW .
For any h ∈ L2(FΘ), ∫
(Ψh)2dFW =
∫ [ ∫
h(θ)fΘ|W (θ|w)dλ(θ)
]2
dFW (w)
=
∫ (
E[h(Θig)|Wig = w]
)2
dFW (w)
≤
∫ [
E[|h(Θig)|2|Wig = w]dFW (w)
= E[|h(Θig)|2] <∞.
By boundedness of fΘ|W , Ψ is a compact linear operator. Then, Theorem 15.16 in Kress (2014)
implies there exist non-negative reals {τj : j ∈ N} and orthonormal sequences {φj : j ∈ N},
{ϕj : j ∈ N} in L2(FΘ) and H, respectively, such that
Ψh =
∞∑
j=1
τj〈h, φj〉Θϕj
where 〈h, φ〉Θ =
∫
hφdFΘ. Also let 〈m,ϕ〉W =
∫
mϕdFW .
Without loss of generality, assume τj > 0 for all j. Define
Ψ†m =
∞∑
j=1
τ−1j 〈m,ϕj〉Wφj .
By definition, Ψ†Ψh = h on L2(FΘ).
Integral with respect to fW |J,B
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fW |J,B/fW ∈ H because
fW |J,B(w|s,b) =
∫
fW |Θ,J,B(w|θ, s,b)fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dλ(θ)
=
∫
fW |Θ,B(w|θ,b)fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dλ(θ)
=
∫
fW |Θ(w|θ)fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dλ(θ)
= Ψ(fΘ|J,B/fΘ)(w)fW (w)
and fΘ|J,B/fΘ ∈ L2(FΘ), where the second equality holds by J = J(Θ,A,η) and η ⊥ (W,Θ)|B
and the third follows from independence W ⊥ B|Θ.
Then, Ψ†(fW |J,B/fW ) = fΘ|J,B/fΘ. Write m(θ) = E[ωig|Θig = θ]. If the interchange of integral
and infinite sum is permitted,
E[ωig|Jig = s,Bg = b] =
∫
E[ωig|Θig = θ, Jig = s,Bg = b]fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dλ(θ)
=
∫
E[ωig|Θig = θ]fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dλ(θ)
=
∫
m(θ)
fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)
fΘ(θ)
dFΘ(θ)
=
∫
m(θ)
(
Ψ†fW |J,B(·|s,b)/fW (·)
)
(θ)dFΘ(θ)
=
∫
m(θ)
[ ∞∑
j=1
τ−1j 〈fW |J,B(·|s,b)/fW (·), ϕj〉Wφj(θ)
]
dFΘ(θ)
=
∞∑
j=1
τ−1j 〈fW |J,B(·|s,b)/fW (·), ϕj〉W
∫
m(θ)φj(θ)dFΘ(θ) (12)
=
∫ [ ∞∑
j=1
τ−1j
∫
m(θ)φj(θ)dFΘ(θ)ϕj(w)
]
fW |J,B(w|s,b)dµ(w) (13)
where I use ωig ⊥ Bg|Θig for the second equality. To justify (12), it suffices to show
∞∑
j=1
∫
τ−1j
∣∣〈fW |J,B(·|s,b)/fW (·), ϕj〉W ∣∣|m(θ)φj(θ)|dFΘ(θ) <∞.
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Using fW |J,B/fW = ΨfΘ|J,B/fΘ,
〈fW |J,B(·|s,b)/fW (·), ϕj〉W = 〈Ψ(fΘ|J,B/fΘ), ϕj〉W
=
〈 ∞∑
`=1
λ`〈fΘ|J,B/fΘ, φ`〉Θϕ`, ϕj
〉
W
=
∞∑
`=1
λ`〈fΘ|J,B/fΘ, φ`〉Θ〈ϕ`, ϕj〉W
= τj〈fΘ|J,B/fΘ, φj〉Θ.
Thus, it suffices to have
∞∑
j=1
∣∣〈fΘ|J,B/fΘ, φj〉Θ∣∣〈|m|, |φj |〉Θ ≤ ‖m‖Θ ∞∑
j=1
∣∣〈fΘ|J,B/fΘ, φj〉Θ∣∣ <∞
where ‖ · ‖Θ is the norm induced by 〈·, ·〉Θ and I use ‖φj‖Θ = 1 for j ∈ N. For (13), it suffices to
show
∞∑
j=1
∫
τ−1j |fW |J,B(w|s,b)ϕj(w)|
∣∣〈m,φj〉Θ∣∣dµ(w)
≤
∞∑
j=1
τ−1j
∣∣〈m,φj〉Θ∣∣[ ∫ |fW |J,B(w|s,b)|2dµ(w) ∫ |ϕj(w)|2dµ(w)]1/2
≤ C
∞∑
j=1
τ−1j
∣∣〈m,φj〉Θ∣∣ <∞.
Thus, the interchageability follows from Assumption 4.
Since
ψ(w) =
∞∑
j=1
τ−1j αjϕj(w), αj = 〈m,φj〉Θ,
{αj/τj : j ∈ N} is square-summable, and {ϕj : j ∈ N} is an orthonormal set with respect to FW , ψ
is square integrable with respect to FW .
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A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
By taking conditional expectations given FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg),
E[YiJigg|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
= E[XJigg|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]′β + E[Wig|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]′γ +
∫
ψ(w)dFW |J,B(w|Jig,Bg)
and subtracting this conditional expectation from the equation (11),
YiJigg − E[YiJigg|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
=
{
XJigg − E[XJigg|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
}′
β +
{
Wig − E[Wig|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
}′
γ + εig.
Writing Vig = (X
′
Jigg
W ′ig)
′,
E[{Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,Bg ]}YiJigg] = E[{Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,Bg ]}{Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,Bg ]}′]
 β
γ
 .
Then, the invertibility condition (ii) guarantees identifiability of β.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Below, I use the following notational conventions. For two sequences of real numbers an and bn,
an . bn means there exists a constant C not dependent on n such that an/bn ≤ C for n large
enough. For sequences of random variables Xn and Yn, Xn .P Yn means that there exists a fixed
constant C satisfying Pr(Xn ≤ CYn)→ 1 as n→∞. Given a symmetric matrix X, I write λmax(X)
and λmin(X) for largest and smallest eigenvalues of the matrix X. Define λ¯K = λmax(QK) and
λ˜ = 1/λmin(QK).
Also, define
rK =
( ∞∑
k=K+1
δkE[ρk(W11)|J11,B1], . . . ,
∞∑
k=K+1
δkE[ρk(WNG)|JNG,BG]
)′
ε = (ε11, . . . , εNG)
′.
Proof. Lemma 2 below implies the first part. By Var(χs − E[ωig|Jig = s,Bg]) > 0, E[εisgεjsg] > 0
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and the minimum eigenvalue of
E[ψNgψ′Ng] =
1
N
E[PKigP ′Kigε2ig] + (1− 1/N)E[PKigP ′Kjgεigεjg]
is bounded from below uniformly in K. In addition, ‖Q−1K ‖ ≥ 1/λmax(QK), which is bounded away
from zero uniformly. Thus, λmin(ΩK) is bounded away from zero uniformly.
For the asymptotic normality of the oracle estimator, note ψNg is mean zero and independent
across t. I verify Lindberg’s condition. The variance matrix is the identity matrix by construction.
For any vector v, I want to show for all d > 0,
E[|v′Ω−1/2K SQ−1K ψNg|21{|v′Ω−1/2K SQ−1K ψNg| ≥ d
√
G}]→ 0.
Letting $ig = v
′Ω−1/2K SQ
−1
K PKig, we have v
′Ω−1/2K SQ
−1
K ψNg =
∑
i$igεig/N and |$ig| . ζK .
E[|v′Ω−1/2K SQ−1K ψNg|21{|v′Ω−1/2K SQ−1K ψNg| ≥ d
√
G}]
≤ E 1
N
N∑
i=1
|$ig|2 1
N
N∑
i=1
|εig|21
{∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|εig|2
∣∣∣1/2 ≥ d√G/ζK}
≤ E[|$ig|2] sup
PKg
E
[ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|εig|21
{∣∣∣ 1
N
N∑
i=1
|εig|2
∣∣∣1/2 ≥ d√G/ζK}∣∣∣PKg]
≤ E[|$ig|2] ζ
2
K
d2G
sup
PKg
E
[( 1
N
N∑
i=1
|εig|2
)2∣∣∣PKg] . ζ4K/G→ 0.
Now I prove the asymptotic (first-order) equivalency between the oracle and feasible estimators.
Let θ = (β′, γ′, δ1, . . . , δK) and we have
βˆ − β = SQ˜−1K Pˆ′K(PK − PˆK)θ/NG+ SQ˜−1K Pˆ′KrK/NG+ SQ˜−1K Pˆ′Kε/NG
≡ I + II + III.
For I, Lemmas 2, 3, and 5 imply that it is OP(θ˜K max{ζK ,
√
K}√K log(NG)/NG). For II, the
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calculation done in Lemma 2 yields that it is OP(
√
λ˜KK
−b), and for III,
SQ˜−1K Pˆ
′
Kε/NG = S{Q˜−1K − Qˆ−1K }(PˆK −PK)′ε/NG+ S{Q˜−1K − Qˆ−1K }P′Kε/NG
+ Qˆ−1K (PˆK −PK)′ε/NG+ Qˆ−1K P′Kε/NG
= Qˆ−1K P
′
Kε/NG+OP(λ˜
2
K max{ζK ,
√
K}
√
K log(NG)/NG+ λ˜K
√
K/NG).
A.3.1 Lemmas for Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma 2. Assume ζ2K λ˜
2
K λ¯K logK/G→ 0.
βˆoracle − β = SQ−1K P′Kε/NG+OP((λ˜K)1/2K−b) +OP
( λ˜2KζK λ¯K√logK
G
)
where ζK = (NG)
1/mw +G1/mx + ξK .
Proof. By decomposition, βˆoracle = β + S(P
′
KPK)
−1P′K(rK + ε) and
βˆoracle − β = SQ−1K P′Kε/NG+ S(P′KPK)−1P′KrK + S
{
(P′KPK/NG)
−1 −Q−1K
}
P′Kε/NG.
First, Lemma 6.2 in Belloni et al. (2015) implies
‖(P′KPK/NG)−QK‖ = OP
(√ζ2K λ¯K logK
G
)
. (14)
Thus, the smallest eigenvalue of QˆK = (P
′
KPK/NG) is bounded below by λmin(QK){1 + oP(1)} if
ζ2K λ˜
2
K λ¯K logK/G→ 0. Using Frobenius norm ‖ · ‖F ,
‖(P′KPK)−1P′KrK‖2F = r′KPKQˆ−1/2K Qˆ−1K Qˆ−1/2K P′KrK/(NG)2
.P λ˜Kr′KPK(P′KPK)−1P′KrK/NG
. λ˜Kr′KrK/NG = OP(λ˜KK−2b).
For S{(P′KPK/NG)−1−Q−1K }P′Kε/NG, since εig is conditionally mean zero given PKig, it suffices
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to look at its variance. For the conditional variance given PK ,
N−2G−2
∥∥∥S{(P′KPK
NG
)−1 −Q−1K } G∑
g=1
P′KgE[εgε′g|PKg]PKg
{(P′KPK
NG
)−1 −Q−1K }′S′∥∥∥
≤ G−1∥∥S{(P′KPK/NG)−1 −Q−1K } 1NG
G∑
g=1
N∑
i=1
PKigP
′
Kig
{
(P′KPK/NG)
−1 −Q−1K
}′
S′
∥∥
= G−1
∥∥S{(P′KPK/NG)−1 −Q−1K }∥∥2‖P′KPK/NG‖ = OP(G−1λ˜4K ζ2K λ¯2K logKG )
where I use A−1 −B−1 = B−1(B −A)A−1.
Lemma 3. Let Q˜K = (Pˆ
′
KPˆK/NG)
−1. Under max{ζK ,
√
K}λ˜K
√
K log(NG)/NG→ 0,
‖Q˜−1K ‖ .P ‖Qˆ−1K ‖
Proof. Using Lemma 5
‖Pˆ′KPˆK/NG−P′KPK/NG‖ ≤ ‖PˆK −PK‖2/NG+ 2‖(PˆK −PK‖/NG
= OP
(
max{ζK ,
√
K}
√
K log(NG)/NG
)
.
Lemma 4. If Assumption 6 holds, then
max
1≤g≤G
1≤i≤N
‖PˆKig − PKig‖ = OP(
√
K/N).
Proof. By definition,
‖PˆKig − PKig‖2 =
K∑
`=1
( 1
NJigg
N∑
j=1
ρ`(Wjg)1{Jjg = Jig} − E[ρ`(Wjg)|Jjg = Jig,Bg]
)2
and using Nsg/N ≥ c > 0 for all s ∈ S and t with probability approaching one,
1
NJigg
N∑
j=1
ρ`(Wjg)1{Jjg = Jig} − E[ρ`(Wjg)|Jjg = Jig,Bg]
= OP(1)
1
N
∑
j 6=i
(
ρ`(Wjg)1{Jjg = Jig} − E[ρ`(Wjg)|Jjg = Jig,Bg]
)
+
ρ(Wig)
N
OP(1).
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Conditional on Jig and Bg, the summand is independent across j and Corollary 4.3 in Pollard
(1989) implies that
sup
`∈N
∣∣∣ 1√
N
∑
j 6=i
(
ρ`(Wjg)1{Jjg = Jig} − E[ρ`(Wjg)|Jjg = Jig,Bg]
)∣∣∣ = OP(1).
The uniformity of the bound with respect to the conditioning variables (Jig,Bg) indicates that the
above bound hold uniformly in (i, g) ∈ {1, . . . , N} × {1, . . . , G}.
Lemma 5. Under the hypothesis of Lemma 4,
‖P′K(PˆK −PK)‖ = OP(
√
GNK log(NG) max{ζK ,
√
K}).
Proof.
P′K(PˆK −PK) =
G∑
g=1
N∑
i=1
PKig(PˆKig − PKig)′ ≡
G∑
g=1
Ξg.
I use Theorem 1.6 in Tropp (2012). Using Lemma 4, ‖PˆKig − PKig‖ ≤ C
√
K/N with probability
arbitrary close to one with some large constant C and
‖Ξg‖ ≤ C
N∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
‖PKig‖
√
K/N ≤ CζK
√
NK
For the variance terms,
‖E[ΞgΞ′g]‖ =
∥∥∥∥ N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[PKigP ′Kjg(PˆKig − PKig)′(PˆKjg − PKjg)]
∥∥∥∥
.
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[‖PKigP ′Kjg‖]K/N ≤ N2ζ2K(K/N) = ζ2KNK
‖E[Ξ′gΞg]‖ =
∥∥∥∥ N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[(PˆKjg − PKjg)(PˆKig − PKig)′P ′KigPKjg]
∥∥∥∥
≤
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[‖PˆKjg − PKjg‖‖PˆKig − PKig‖|P ′KigPKjg|] . N2(K/N)K = K2N.
Then, Theorem 1.6 in Tropp (2012) implies
Pr
(∥∥∥ G∑
g=1
Ξg
∥∥∥ ≥M) ≤ 2NG exp( −M2/2
NGK max{ζ2K ,K}+ ζK
√
NKM/3
)
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and taking M =
√
TNK log(NG) max{ζK ,
√
K} shows the desired result.
Lemma 6. If Assumptions 6 and 8 hold,
‖(PˆK −PK)′ε/NG‖ = OP(
√
K/NG).
Proof.
E‖(PˆK −PK)′ε/NG‖2 = E
∥∥∥ 1
NG
G∑
g=1
N∑
i=1
(PˆKig − PKig)εig
∥∥∥2
=
1
N2G2
G∑
g=1
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[(PˆKig − PKig)(PˆKjg − PKjg)εigεjg]
. G−1K
N
1
N2
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
E[|εigεjg|].
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Recall
ΩˆK = SQ˜
−1
K ΣˆKQ˜
−1
K S
′
where Q˜K = Pˆ
′
KPˆK/NG,
ΣˆK =
1
G
G∑
g=1
ψˆNgψˆ
′
Ng ψˆNg =
1
N
N∑
i=1
PˆKig(Yig − Pˆ ′Kig θˆ)
and θˆ = (Pˆ′KPˆK)
−1(Pˆ′KY). Using the lemmas below,
‖Ωˆ−1/2K −Ω−1/2K ‖ ≤ ‖Ωˆ−1/2K ‖‖Ωˆ1/2K −Ω1/2K ‖‖Ω−1/2K ‖ ≤ λ˜K{2λ¯−1/2K }−1‖ΩˆK −ΩK‖
and
‖ΩˆK −ΩK‖ = OP(‖Qˆ−1K −Q−1K ‖‖ΣˆK‖‖Qˆ−1K ‖+ ‖Qˆ−1K ‖2‖ΣˆK −ΣK‖),
which shows the result.
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Lemma 7. Under the hypothesis of Theorem 3,
∥∥∥ΣˆK −Σ∥∥∥ = OP(ζ2K(ζK√K/G+√K/N +K−α) + ζK√(NG)1/mε logK/G).
Proof.
‖ΩˆK −ΩK‖ ≤ ‖ΩˆK − 1
G
G∑
g=1
ψNgψ
′
Ng‖+ ‖
1
G
G∑
g=1
ψNgψ
′
Ng −ΩK‖.
For the second term, Lemma 6.2 in Belloni et al. (2015) implies that it isOP(ζK
√
(NG)1/mε logK/G).
For the first term,
ΣˆK =
1
G
G∑
g=1
(
ψˆNg − ψNg
)
ψˆ′Ng +
1
G
G∑
g=1
ψNg
(
ψˆNg − ψNg
)′
+
1
G
G∑
g=1
ψNgψ
′
Ng
and
ψˆNg − ψNg = 1
N
N∑
i=1
(PˆKig − PKig)(Yig − Pˆ ′Kig θˆ)−
1
N
N∑
i=1
PKig(Pˆ
′
Kig θˆ − P ′Kigθ) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
PKigrig
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(PˆKig − PKig)(εig + rig) + 1
N
N∑
i=1
(PˆKig − PKig)(P ′Kigθ − Pˆ ′Kig θˆ)
− 1
N
N∑
i=1
PKig(Pˆ
′
Kig θˆ − P ′Kigθ) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
PKigrig.
Note ‖PˆKig − PKig‖ = OP(
√
K/N) and ‖θˆ − θ‖ = OP(
√
K/G). The latter follows from
‖θˆ − θ‖ = ‖Q−1K P′Kε/NG‖+ oP(G−1/2) = OP(
√
K/G).
Then,
‖P ′Kigθ − Pˆ ′Kig θˆ‖ ≤ ‖PKig‖‖θˆ − θ‖+ ‖PˆKig − PKig‖θˆ‖
= OP(ζK
√
K/G+
√
K/N)
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and
∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(PˆKig − PKig)(εig + rig)
∥∥∥ = OP(√K/N)
∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
(PˆKig − PKig)(P ′Kigθ − Pˆ ′Kig θˆ)
∥∥∥ = OP(K/N + ζKK/√NG)
∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
PKig(Pˆ
′
Kig θˆ − P ′Kigθ)
∥∥∥ = OP(ζ2K√K/G+ ζK√K/N)
∥∥∥ 1
N
N∑
i=1
PKigrig
∥∥∥ = OP(ζKK−α).
Thus, ‖ψˆNg−ψNg‖ = OP(ζK(ζK
√
K/G+
√
K/N+K−α)) and the conclusion follows from ‖ψNg‖+
‖ψˆNg‖ = OP(ζK).
Lemma 8 (Lemma 2.2 in Schmitt (1992)). Let A and B two symmetric matrices satisfying A  µ2aI,
B  µ2bI, where A  B denotes A−B is positive definite. Then,
‖A1/2 −B1/2‖ ≤ {µa + µb}−1‖A−B‖.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
By taking conditional expectation give FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg),
E[YiJigg|FW |J,B] = E[XJigg|FW |J,B]′β + E[Wig|FW |J,B]′γ +
∫
ψ(w)dFW |J,B(w|Jig,Bg).
Then, subtracting it from the original equation,
YiJigg − E[YiJigg|FW |J,B] = {Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,B]}′
 β
γ
+ εig
where Vig = (X
′
Jigg
,W ′ig)
′. Then, letting Z˜ig = (Z ′Jigg,W
′
ig)
′,
E[Z˜ig{YiJigg − E[YiJigg|FW |J,B]}] = E[Z˜ig{Vig − E[Vig|FW |J,B]}′]
 β
γ

and full column rank of the matrix implies identifiability of β.
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A.6 Proof of Theorem 5
By the independence assumption
fW,ε|J,B(w, e|s,b) =
∫
fW,ε|J,B,Θ(w, e|s,b, θ)fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dθ
=
∫
fW,ε|Θ(w, e|θ)fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dθ
and similarly,
fW |J,B(w|s,b) =
∫
fW |Θ(w|θ)fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b)dθ.
By injectivity of Ψ, we have
Ψ†
(
fW |J,B(·|s,b)
)
(θ) = fΘ|J,B(θ|s,b).
Then, conditioning on FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg), the function fW,ε|J,B is non-stochastic. Therefore,
E[YiJigg|XJigg = x, FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
= E[m(x,Wig, εiJig)|XJigg = x, FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
= E[E[m(x,Wig, εiJig)|XJigg = x, Jig,Bg]|XJigg = x, FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
= E
[ ∫
m(x,w, e)E[fW,ε|J,B(w, e|Jig,Bg)|XJigg = x,Bg]
∣∣XJigg = x, FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]
=
∫
m(x,w, e)E[fW,ε|J,B(w, e|Jig,Bg)|XJigg = x, FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]d(w, e)
=
∫
m(x,w, e)E[fW,ε|J,B(w, e|Jig,Bg)|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg)]d(w, e)
where the third equality use the display below, the second-to-last equality uses the Fubini theorem to
interchange the order of integration, and the last equality uses fWε|J,B is non-stochastic conditional
on FW |J,B. For the third equality in the above display,
E[m(x,Wig, εiJigg)|Jig,Bg] =
S∑
s=1
E[m(x,Wig, εisg)|Jig = s,Bg] Pr(Jig = s|Bg)
=
S∑
s=1
∫
m(x,w, e)fW,ε|J,B(w, e|s,Bg)d(w, e) Pr(Jig = s|Bg)
=
∫
m(x,w, e)E[fW,ε|J,B(w, e|Jig,Bg)|Bg]d(w, e).
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Finally, letting ν be the measure corresponding to the distribution of FW |J,B, which is identifiable
from the data,
∫
E[YiJigg|XJigg = x, FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg) = F ]dν(F )
=
∫
m(x,w, e)E[fW,ε|J,B(w, e|Jig,Bg)|FW |J,B(·|Jig,Bg) = F ]d(w, e)dν(F )
=
∫
m(x,w, e)E[fW,ε|J,B(w, e|Jig,Bg)]d(w, e)
=
∫
m(x,w, e)fW,ε(w, e)d(w, e).
B Details of DGPs for Monte Carlo Studies
The details of the DGPs used in the simulation studies are following. I use G = 1, 000 and for each
city, N = 300 and S = 3 with the constraint that each group can have at most 115 people. The
final sample from the NLS72 dataset contains 917 schools, which I treated as independent draws.
This assumption is valid if schools are geographically isolated from each other.
The econometric model generating the data is
Yis = Xsβ +W
′
iγ + ωi + χs + is
Ji = arg max
s∈{1,2,3}
{Θ′iAs + ηis}
where β = −0.15 and γ = (−0.0003, 0.06)′ are taken from an estimate in the NLS72. Also, Wi has
a bivariate normal distribution with mean (12.37, 10.92) and covariance matrix
 4.25 0.49
0.49 0.42
 .
The means and covariance matrix are based on the NLS72 data. The preference coefficient Θi is
generated by
Θi = Wi + ωi1 + νi
where 1 is 2 × 1 vector whose elements are unity and νi is a mean-zero bivariate normal with
covariance matrix
[
1 0.25
0.25 1
]
. For χs and is, they have a mean-zero normal distribution with
standard deviation 0.446, which imitates the standard error of a regression from the data. The
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idiosyncratic term ηis is drawn from mean-zero normal distribution with standard deviation 2. For
Xs, I use the empirical distribution of a school-level variable observed in the NLS72 dataset; As
consists of Xs and a binary variable that takes value 1 with probability 0.29 and has correlation of
0.25 with Xs.
For ωi, each DGP generates this variable in different ways. For DGP1, ωi has a joint normal
distribution with Wi, its mean is 2.16, variance is 0.51, and the covariance with Wi is 0.051, 0.024.
The joint normality leads to the linear specification of the control function. For DGP2, I model
ωi = 0.5 ∗W 21i + 0.5 ∗W 32i
where W1i and W2i represent the first and second component of Wi. For the third DGP,
ωi = 0.1 ∗ ui + 2 ∗ 1{W1i +W2i − E[W1i +W2i] > vi}
where ui has the same distribution as ωi in DGP1 (jointly normal withWi) and vi =d Normal(0, 0.2).
In terms of implementation, I generate the random variables and compute utilities of choosing
different groups for each individual. Then, I use linear programming to find an allocation that
maximizes the sum of utilities under the group size constraint. Altonji and Mansfield use this step
in their simulation and I follow their procedure.
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